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Jones: Counsel in Civil Gang Injunctions

COMMENT
FAMILY TIES OR
CRIMINAL CONTACTS:
A CASE FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL GANG
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS THAT
AFFECT FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
INTRODUCTION

In mid-2007 Antonio Buitrago faced a civil action that would
prohibit him from meeting his cousin within a sixty block area of San
Francisco. 1 This suit was not brought in response to any specific
criminal behavior of Mr. Buitrago, nor was it brought in any criminal
court. 2 If the action was successful, however, both cousins would face
up to six months in the county jail should they decide to have a family
get-together within a specified public zone. 3 Moreover, because this suit

I See Complaint for Injunctive Relief Against the Norteno Criminal Street Gang, People v.
Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007), [hereinafter "Norteno
Complaint"]; see a/so Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ex Parte
Application for Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction, at 6, People v. Norteno, No.
CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter "Opposition to Application for
OSC"].
2 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007) ("I [Antonio Buitrago] do not have a criminal
history").
3 Those named as gang members are enjoined by a court order from "[s]tanding, sitting,
walking, driving, gathering, or appearing anywhere in the public view or any place accessible by or

41
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2

42

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

was brought under civil law it was not clear whether the court would be
required to appoint a lawyer on Mr. Buitrago's behalf.4 Thus, in mid2007 it appeared that Mr. Buitrago would soon be facing the bleak
situation of self-representation before the San Francisco Superior Court
in order to preserve his right to see his cousin in public. 5
Mr. Buitrago is a 23-year-old Latino. 6 He was raised in San
Francisco's Mission Districe with his three sisters and his cousin,
Antonio Garcia, whom he calls "brother."g Mr. Buitrago is in a
committed relationship of seven years and has a young daughter Alyssa. 9
Like most young parents, he hopes for a better life for his family.lo It is
because of this hope that Mr. Buitrago has gone back to school to get his
GED.ll Mr. Buitrago sees the Mission District as his home, so even
though it is a tough neighborhood, he has no plans to leave. 12 The
to the public, with any known member of the NORTENO Criminal Street Gang, excluding: I) when
all individuals are inside a school in class or school business; and 2) when all individuals are inside a
church." Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction, at 17, People v. Norteno, No. CGC
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) [hereinafter "OSC"]; see CAL. PENAL CODE §
I 66(a)4 (West 2008) ("(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), every person guilty of
any contempt of court, of any of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor: ... (4) Willful
disobedience of the terms as written of any process or court order or out-of-state court order,
lawfully issued by any court, including orders pending trial."); Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Application for OSC, at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
4 Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to
counsel in a gang injunction case).
5 See id.; Norteno Complaint. No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21,
2007); 19A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 109 (2001) ("The following is a suggested admonition to a
defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation: I. Self-representation is
almost always unwise and the defendant may conduct a defense to his or her own detriment; 2.
Defendant will ... get no help from the judge; 3. The prosecution will be represented by experienced
professional counsel who will have the advantage of skill, training, education, experience and
ability; and 4. Defendant will have no special library privileges, will receive no extra time for
preparation and will have no staff of investigators at his or her beck and call.").
6 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
7 The Mission District is a southern neighborhood in San Francisco that has been described
as a "flamboyant mosaic" that boasts "the most flourishing mural scene in the country" and is home
to "solidly working-class ... Latinos" and "radicals ... [of] failed revolutions." Gregory Dicum,
San Francisco's Mission District: Eclectic, Eccentric, Electric, N.Y. TIMES, at
http://travel.nytirnes.coml2005/11120/tra-vel/20next.htmINov. 20, 2005 (last visited Sept. 21,2008);
Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 1-2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
8 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
9 [d. at 5.
10 [d. at 5.
II [d. at 1-2.
12 From 2004-2007 out of the ten districts in San Francisco the Mission District averaged the
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Mission District is where his friends live, where he volunteers his time to
work with local "at risk" youth, and where he partakes in community
events like the Dia de los Muertos.1 3
However, some of Mr. Buitrago's activities in the Mission District
have a grittier side. He sings "gangsta' rap.,,14 He continues to associate
with some of his childhood friends who are admitted gang members. 15
He has declined to help officers in a gang-related investigation. 16
Moreover, his ties with gang members are enough for a San Francisco
police officer, Mario Molina, to declare that Mr. Buitrago is himself a
gang member and that he goes by the gang nickname "Tone." 17 In
support of motions by the San Francisco City Attorney, Officer Molina
declared that, by being a gang member, Mr. Butragio contributes to the
higher crime rate that the Mission District endures. IS Because of these
factors, Mr. Buitrago found himself facing a civil gang injunction lawsuit
initiated by the San Francisco City Attorney's Office. 19
Civil gang injunctions are an attempt to combat the problem of
gangs by prohibiting alleged gang members from engaging in specific
activities within a specific area. 20 Civil gang injunctions are empowered
by the doctrine of public nuisance, which provides a cause of action for
fourth highest in homicide. Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Report on Public Safety Condition 4
(July 23, 2007); Norteno Complaint, at 3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007). The complaint alleges that the gang Norteno "dominates the
neighborhood with verbal and physical intimidation .... " Indeed, on March 29, 2006, Mr. Buitrago
was shot in the back by unknown assailants in his neighborhood. Opposition to Application for
OSC, Exhibit A at 7-8, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5,
2007).
13 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 9, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492, (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
14 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 4-5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007); Expert Declaration of SFPD Officer Molina In
support of Ex Parte Application for Order To Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction and
Preliminary Gang Injunction (Part I of 2 Parts) at 35, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) [hereinafter Expert Declaration].
15 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
16 Expert Declaration, at 36, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007).
17 Expert Declaration, at 35-36. People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno,
No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5,2007).
18 Expert Declaration, at 1-6, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007).
19 Norteno Complaint, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct.
June 21, 2007); Expert Declaration, at 35-36, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007).
20 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1120-1123 (1997); Norteno Complaint, at
3-5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21,2007).
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an unreasonable and substantial interference with a right common to the
general pUblic. 2l Under a civil gang injunction, certain activities of the
named individuals are declared a public nuisance because of their alleged
gang involvement. 22 The individuals named in the suit are then barred
from the activities that enable the gang to function and thereby cause a
nuisance.23 Many of these prohibited activities are already illega1. 24 For
instance, the gang injunction that Mr. Buitrago faced would forbid him
from committing such crimes as trespassing or selling, possessing, or
manufacturing a controlled substance. 25 However, the injunction would
also forbid Mr. Buitrago from many lawful activities, such as wearing
red clothing, being out in public between ten o'clock in the evening and
sunrise, and associating with any other alleged gang member. 26
One controversial aspect of these suits is that they attempt to
combat a criminal problem through the civil arena.27 A defendant in a
criminal action is entitled to far more safeguards than a defendant in a
civil action. 28 In particular, the right to counsel in criminal cases is

21 Restatement (Second) Torts § 8218 (1979); see also CAL. CIV. CODE 3480 (West 2008)
("A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal."); cf People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1102-1106
(1997).
22 Norteno Complaint, at 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007).
23 Flahive v. City of Dana Point, 72 Cal. App. 4th 241, 244, 245 n.5 (Ct. App. 1999)
("[California] Civil Code section 3491 provides three remedies for a public nuisance: (I) a criminal
proceeding; (2) a civil action; or (3) abatement .... In its purest sense "abatement" is the act of
eliminating the condition that causes the nuisance.").
24 Norteno Complaint, at 15, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007) (praying for "an Order enjoining and restraining NORTENO and its members,
associates, affiliates, recruits, and anyone else acting on its behalf, from committing crimes ... and
any other conduct amounting to a nuisance .... ").
25 Norteno Complaint, at 16, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007).
26 1d. at 16-17.
27 1d. at 16-18.
28 See People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1253-57 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding there
is no right to a jury trial in a civil gang injunction action, and the standard of clear and convincing
evidence is used in the determination of such actions); see also Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.
App. 4th 1500, 1514 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to counsel in a civil gang injunction action).
In contrast, for the standards used in criminal cases, see U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In criminal
pr~secutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [to a trial] by an impartial jury."); Clark v. Ariz., 548
U.S. 735, 738 (2006) ("a defendant is innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 34344 (1963) (finding a right to counsel in criminal actions). The California courts have expressed
concern in situations where "the membrane separating civil issues from criminal charges ... is
especially thin." Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 65 (Ct. App. 1980).
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guaranteed to a defendant,29 whereas in civil cases, one is provided with
counsel only in special circumstances. 3o
Moreover, a California
appellate decision, Iraheta v. Superior Court, held that civil gang
injunctions were not the kind of civil case that warranted the
appointment of counse1. 31 Specifically, the court in Iraheta determined
that "[t]o expand the due process right of legal counsel to the alleged
gang members in this case would be unprecedented, and would result in
the expansion of the right to counsel to a number of other civil actions. ,,32
Thus, if individuals are targeted by a civil gang injunction, and cannot
afford lawyers, they must represent themselves in their own defense
against government-employed attorneys or face a default judgment.
Mr. Buitrago's situation is particularly unusual because the
injunction he faced infringed upon a fundamentally intimate sphere: his
family?3 Specifically, the injunction Mr. Buitrago faced alleged that
both he and his cousin, Antonio Garcia, were gang members and
therefore sought to enjoin them from meeting together in pUblic. 34 Thus,
in mid-2007 Mr. Buitrago found himself facing the prospect of litigation
that would have barred him from meeting his cousin in public, without
the benefit of an attorney.35 Under the terms of the injunction, if Mr.
Butragio were to leave from school, cross the street into 'his
neighborhood, and see his cousin, he would have to cross back over to
the other side of the street, or pass by his cousin and act as though they
were strangers. 36 If Mr. Buitrago were to stop and talk to his cousin in

29

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963) (fmding a right to counsel in criminal

actions).
30 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs .. 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (l98\); White v. Bd. of Med. Quality
Assurance, 128 Cal. App. 3d 699,707 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the general rule is that there is
no due process right to counsel in civil cases).
31 Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1515 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to
counsel in a civil gang injunction action).
32

Id.

Expert Declaration, at 35, 49, People v. Norteno. No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 8-9, People v. Norteno. No. CGC
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
34 Expert Declaration, at 35, 49, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 8-9, People v. Norteno. No. CGC
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
35 Those enjoined under the injunction are prohibited from "standing sitting walking driving
gathering or appearing in public." Norteno Complaint, at 17, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007).
36 The Precita center where Mr. Buitrago is taking classes is located at 534 Precita Avenue,
which is on the border of the injunction zone and his home neighborhood. See Norteno Complaint, at
2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to
Application for OSC at 15, Exhibit A at 3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
33
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public, he could be prosecuted and end up spending up to six months in
county jail.37
This comment argues that when an individual is targeted by a civil
gang injunction that interferes with that individual's family relationships,
due process requires the appointment of counsel for that individual. 38
This comment does not argue that civil gang injunctions should be
prohibited, or even that civil gang injunctions should not be able to
enjoin family members from seeing each other in pUblic. 39 Part I
discusses the problem of gangs and how civil gang injunctions have
emerged to combat them. Part II explores factors considered for the
appointment of counsel in civil cases and why family relationships put a
personal interest at stake that warrants such appointment. Finally, Part
III explores how the government's interests and the risk of erroneous
decisions in civil gang injunction proceedings that interfere with family
relationships further warrant the appointment of counsel.
I. THE RISE OF THE CIVIL GANG INJUNCTION

In order to gain a nuanced understanding of civil gang injunctions
and to discuss them effectively, it is important to first understand how
and why they arose. The proposition that gangs are a serious problem is
37 CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 2008) ("(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and
(d), every person guilty of any contempt of court, of any of the following kinds, is guilty of a
misdemeanor: ... (4) Willful disobedience of the terms as written of any process or court order or
out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by any court, including orders pending triaL"); Opposition to
Application for OSC, at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept.
5,2007).
38 The basic argument functions by assembling three guidelines. First, "[t]he essence of due
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (quoting
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.s. 123, 171-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Second, "recent jurisprudence restricts the reach of the protections of substantive due process
primarily to liberties 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" Armendariz v. Penman.
75 F.3d 1311,1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977». Third, "the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history." Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
39 There is already a wealth of law review articles on the constitutional validity and
desirability of civil gang injunctions. Arguments in support of gang injunctions are described in the
following: Gregory Walston, Taking the Constitution at it's Word: A Defense of the Use of AntiGang injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 47 (1999); Bergen Herd, injunctions as a Tool to Fight
Gang-Related Problems in California After People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution? 28
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 629 (1998). Arguments against gang injunctions are described in the
following: Joan Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice Critique of
Anti-Gang Public Nuisance injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717 (2000); Matthew Werdeger,
Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement injunctions Against Urban Street
Gangs. 51 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1999). This article also does not address the proper standard a court
should employ in deciding whether to issue a gang injunction.
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not a controversial one. 40 A ten-year study by the Institute for
Intergovernmental Research revealed that from 1996 to 2006 the total
number of gangs in the United States averaged around 25,000. 41
Regardless of whether gang violence is a symptom or root cause of a
larger social issue, most can agree that in light of such statistics gang
violence serves as a blight upon communities and that their harmful
activities should be stopped.42 Enter the power of injunction.
An injunction is a judicial order requiring a person to do or refrain
from doing certain acts. 43 In this capacity injunctions have served as an
age-old remedy to solve state problems. 44 However, the use of
injunctions against gang violence is fairly recent, occurring first in 1981
in Los Angeles,45 and not corning into widespread use until the early
1990s.46 Since then, despite inconclusive and contradictory reports,47
civil gang injunctions have gained popularity and are now regularly used
40 Even the ACLU, which has stated that civil gang injunctions are "futile" and based on a
"false premise," admits that a successful curtailment of gangs would "markedly enhance the safety
and security of the innocent public." ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE
PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 44
(1997).
41 National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, Measuring the Extent of Gang Problems, available
at http://www.iir.comlnygc/nygsa/measurin~the_extenCoCgan~problems.htm (last visited Apr.
13,2008).
42 ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: THE
BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 44 (1997).
43 43A C.J.S. Injunction § I (2008).
44 In the early eighteenth century, public nuisance law actually became a catch-all criminal
action and was defined as "an offense against the public, either by doing a thing which tends to the
annoyance of all the King's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the common good
requires." EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 54 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004); Also, there is an American
tradition of using nuisance as a catch-all to solve state problems. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895) (utilizing the doctrine of public nuisance to stop unions in their efforts during the Pullman car
strikes).
45 Matthew Werdeger, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement
Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs. 51 STAN. L. REv. 409, 414 (1999).
46 EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 65-66 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004).
47 The studies of effectiveness range from positive, to negative, to inconclusive. See Cheryl
L. Maxson, It's Getting Crazy Out There: Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community? 4
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 577 (2005) (finding mixed results on the effectiveness of civil gang
injunctions); ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES:
THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1997) (finding that civil gang
injunctions are ineffective); The Effects of Civil Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crime:
Evidence from Los Angeles County, 45 J.L. & ECON. 60 (2002) (finding a 5%-10% decrease in
violent crime the first year after an injunction is imposed); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GANG WARS:
THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY
STRATEGIES (2007) (reporting that despite widespread use of gang injunctions, Los Angeles remains
the gang capital of the world).
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throughout California. 48 This proliferation of civil gang lllJunction
litigation has been enabled through the tacit approval of the California
Supreme Court in its 1997 decision People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna. 49 In
Acuna the court determined that gang members could be enjoined from
meeting in public because their presence together constituted a public
nuisance. 5o In so ruling, the court rejected a host of constitutional
arguments, including alleged violations of the right to assembly, the right
to free speech, and the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. 51
The Acuna decision begins with a recounting of the horrific
activities of the VST gang in the town of Rocksprings. 52 Due to gang
activity, the residents of Rocksprings had their garages used as urinals,
and their front lawns as drug bazaars. 53 Trapped within their homes, the
residents of Rocksprings could do little more than stand by as murder,
vandalism and theft became commonplace neighborhood events. 54 In
describing these activities, the court paints a picture of an "urban war
zone" where the members of the "community are prisoners in their own
homes.,,55 In such a situation the demand to stop such gang activities
flows quite naturally from a desire to assure ordinary citizens "[t]he
freedom to leave one's house and move about at will, and to have a
measure of personal security.,,56 Moreover, because the doctrine of
public nuisance was such a well-established legal principle, its use to

48 EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 54 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004) (Appendix A lists 41 such
injunctions issued between 1992 and 2001). Also, some of the California Civil Code now is built
around abating criminal action through the device of nuisance. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11570 (West 2008) ("Every building or place used for the purpose of unlawfully selling,
serving, storing, keeping, manufacturing, or giving away any controlled substance... is a
nuisance .... ").
49 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1125 (1997).
50
Id .
5! Id. at 1110-20.
52 Id. at 1100.
53 Id .
54
Id .
55 Id.

56 Id. at 1125; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 98,115 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (finding anti-gang loitering ordinance is not void for vagueness). The dissenters Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas predicated parts of their opinions to find the anti-gang loitering statute
constitutional upon their outrage towards atrocious gang activities, stating that "[t]he human costs
exacted by criminal street gangs are inestimable." Id at 98. Or "the people who will suffer from our
lofty pronouncements [which strikes down the gang loitering ordinance] are people like Ms. Susan
Mary Jackson; people who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and violence
and drugs. They are good decent people who must struggle to overcome their desperate situation,
against all odds, in order to raise their families, earn a living, and remain good citizens." Id. at 115.
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empower a civil gang injunction seemed relatively uncontroversia1. 57
Few states, however, have contemplated using the doctrine of public
nuisance to combat crime, and fewer still have actually used it. 58 In City
of New York v. Andrews, a New York court considered an action similar
to a civil gang injunction against a pimp and prostitution ring. 59 New
York City sought to ban the ring's participants from public view within
the Queens Plaza area between the hours of eleven o'clock in the evening
and seven o'clock in the moming. 6o The New York court refused to
issue the injunction partly on the grounds that it was an inappropriate use
of civil authority and that the "prosecution of criminal matters should be

See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1102-06.
EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 249 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004). Attempts to obtain gang
injunctions in New York City and Phoenix, Arizona, have been denied. As of 2004 the only
successful gang injunction outside of California has occurred in Austin and San Antonio, Texas.
This is not to say that states outside California have sought civil recourse against gangs. In fact,
much harsher civil solutions than civil gang injunctions have been devised and implemented. The
Chicago suburb of Cicero, for instance, passed a gang banishment ordinance, under which those
identified as gang members and determined to be a threat to the community were required to leave
town and never return, or else face a $500-a-day fine. Ordinance Providing for the Enforcement of
Gang Free Zones in the Town of Cicero, Ordinance No 111-99 (April 1999), amending Cicero Code
of Ordinances ch. 35. For extensive and thorough commentary on this particular case, see Stephanie
Smith, Civil Banishment Of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000).
59 City of New York v. Andrews, 719 N.Y.S.2d 442,536-538 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
60 Id. at 44 7. The complete list of relief sought included a prohibition of:
57

58

A. Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view; B.
Loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense, as defined by New York
Penal Law Section 240.37; C. Committing an act of prostitution and/or promoting
prostitution as defined by Penal Law Sections 230.00, and 230.15 et seq.; D. Collecting,
receiving, soliciting money, drugs or any other thing of value for prostitution services
rendered or to be rendered; E. Possessing any weapons including, but not limited to, knives,
box cutters, razors, concealed or loaded firearms, and any other illegal weapon as defined in
the New York State Penal Law, and any other object capable of inflicting serious bodily
injury; F. Blocking free access to the public sidewalks, streets and the areas surrounding the
Subject Neighborhood; G. Approaching individuals or confronting, intimidating, annoying,
harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting or doing anything to obstruct or
delay the free flow of pedestrian traffic; H. Approaching individuals or confronting,
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting or doing
anything to obstruct or delay the free flow of vehicular traffic; I. Littering or causing others
to litter condoms and condom wrappers in the streets and sidewalks; J. Urinating in the
streets, on the sidewalks, in alleyways, or anywhere in public view; K. Trespassing or
encouraging others to trespass on any private property; L. In any manner confronting,
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or
battering any residents, patrons or person or persons who have provided information in
support of this Complaint and in Support for Plaintiff's request for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.
Id. at 477 n.2.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

50

[Vol. 39

left to criminal courtS.,,61 The Acuna court, by contrast, was not
concerned with this distinction: "whether [the nuisance caused] be a
criminal nuisance or not is wholly imrnaterial.,,62 However, by failing to
carefully examine the criminal/civil distinction, the courts have left
defendants facing civil gang injunctions in one of the gray areas of due
process: the appointment of counsel in civil cases. 63
II. WHEN THE RIGHT TO COURT-APPPOINTED COUNSEL ATTACHES IN
CIVIL CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainright
guaranteed the right to counsel in criminal cases under the Sixth
Amendment. 64 The right to counsel in civil cases, however, is not based
on the Sixth Amendment, but rather upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires court-appointed counsel only in
select situations. 65 The recognition of the right to counsel in civil cases
originated in Mathews v. Eldridge, where the Supreme Court found that
"[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.,,66 To this end, the Court held that the
identification of the specific dictates of due process required the
consideration of three factors: 1) the private interests at stake, 2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation, and 3) the government's interest involved. 67
This general test was refined in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services to specifically evaluate at which times due process requires the
appointment of counsel in a civil case. 68 The Lassiter test first asks if
there is a presumption against the right to counsel. 69 Such a presumption

61

Id. at 455.

Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1108.
63 As late as 200 I, a California appellate court indicated in dictum that "the Constitutional
right to counsel in civil cases is evolving." In re Angel, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 1080 (Ct. App.
2001). Other California courts have also expressed concern in situations where "the membrane
separating civil issues from criminal charges ... is especially thin." Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App. 3d 57, 65 (et. App. 1980). Civil gang injunctions and the right to counsel are precisely
such a scenario.
64 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963).
65 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 26-28 (1981) (finding no due process
requirement for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in a proceeding for the termination
of parental status).
66 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
67 Id. at 334-35.
62

68 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. It is interesting to note that the Court observed that even
though there was no due process requirement, "[aj wise public policy, however, may require that
higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution." Id. at 33.

69Id.at31.
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is imposed so long as the action does not threaten to result in a
"deprivation of physicalliberty.,,7o The next step involves weighing the
presumption, if it exists, against the three Eldridge factors. 71 Thus, under
Lassiter, in order to determine if there is a right to counsel in a civil
proceeding, the court must first determine whether a presumption against
the right to counsel exists, and, if such a presumption does exist, then the
court must measure the net weight of the Eldridge factors against the
presumption.72
Using these basic guidelines, the California courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court have acknowledged the right to counsel in a variety of
civil situations, including child custody proceedings/ 3 child dependency
proceedings,74 juvenile commitment hearings,75 parole revocation
proceedings/6 and contempt-of-court cases. 77 California courts have
also expressly declined to recognize a right to counsel in other civil
situations, such as civil forfeiture proceedings78 and civil gang

70 Id. at 30. "Physical liberty" as used in Lassiter seems to encompass direct incarceration,
no matter how "brief." Id. In contrast, the term "physical liberty," in the modern case law, seems to
have gained a much broader meaning. For example, the test to show a deprivation of physical
liberty has been phrased as a requirement that "petitioners ... establish that [the] civil proceedings
may deprive them of an interest that is as fundamental as a right to physical liberty or as paramount
as the right to care, custody and management of one's child." Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.
App.4th 1500, 1509 (Cl. App. 1999).
71 "We must balance these [Eldridge] elements against each other, and then set their net
weight in the scales against the presumption." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
72 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1505 ("The court must balance the 'net weight' of the three
Eldridge factors 'against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the
indigent, ifhe is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom."') (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
73 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 265 (Cl. App. 1983) (finding a right to counsel because
severance of the parent-child relationship amounts to a taking ofliberty).
74 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 33 (1979) (finding a right to counsel in a paternity hearing
because "the state has no legitimate interest incorrectly ascribing parentage and imposing the
obligations of fatherhood on someone other than the child's actual father. Appointment of counsel
for indigent defendants will make the fact-finding process in paternity cases more accurate, thereby
furthering the state's legitimate interests in securing support for dependent children.").
75 Application of Gault, 387 U.S. I, 39 (1967) (finding that a juvenile who faces charges of
delinquency has a right to counsel because the juvenile's right to freedom and the parent's right to
custody are at stake).
76 Gagon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (finding the right to counsel in parole
revocation proceedings on a case by case basis).
77 County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1697 (Cl. App. 1992)
(finding that to hold an indigent defendant in contempt for failing to pay child support was criminal
in nature and required the appointment of counsel).
78 People v. $30,000 U.S. Currency, 35 Cal. App. 4th 936, 944 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding no
right to appointed counsel because, among other factors, defendant did not face incarceration). But
see State v. $1,010.00 in Am. Currency, 722 N.W. 2d 92, 99 (S.D. 2006) (finding a right to counsel
because petitioner faced the loss of an important property interest).
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injunctions. 79 Specifically, the California case Iraheta v. Superior Court
detennined that there is generally no right to court-appointed counsel in a
civil gang injunction action. 80
A. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
In determining whether the right to counsel attaches in the civil
context, it is necessary to first detennine whether the Lassiter
presumption against counsel exists for that particular kind of civil
proceeding. The Lassiter presumption against counsel exists so long as
the impending action does not threaten to deprive one of "physical
liberty.,,81 Unfortunately, the court in Lassiter never explicitly defined
what constitutes a "deprivation of physicalliberty.,,82 Nevertheless, it is
settled that a proceeding that directly imposes a danger of imprisonment
or institutionalization upon an individual counts as a deprivation of
physical liberty.83 The Iraheta court noted that criminal proceedings,
and thus incarceration, are merely a future possibility for those who are
targeted by a civil gang injunction. 84 That is, before an individual faces
incarceration via a civil gang injunction, he or she must first litigate the
civil gang injunction action, lose, violate the injunction, and then have a

Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514-1515 (Ct. App. 1999).
1d.
81 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,31 (1981).
82 Michael Milleman, The State of Due Process Justification For a Right to Counsel in Some
Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733 (2006) (recognizing that the Court only left
"cryptic clues" about the showing necessary to overcome the preumption).
83 Scott v. Il1inois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (stating that the premise that "actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment ... is
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel"); People v. $30,000 U.S. Currency, 35 Cal. App. 4th 936, 944 (Ct.
App. 1995) (finding no right to counsel because "[u]nlike the situation in Salas, in which the
defendant faced incarceration and other serious consequences from an adverse judgment, here,
defendant's interest also is merely financial."); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315-316 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own
behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty ... [is
a] 'deprivation ofliberty"') (citations omitted).
84 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510 ("The possibility that [the] defendant [in Salas] would
suffer the loss of his physical liberty, while a factor, was not a determinative factor."). The severity
of liability inherent in violating a civil gang injunction did not seem to be fully appreciated in the
Iraheta court's opinion. As noted by Matthew Werdegar in Enjoining the Constitution, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 409, 437 (1999), examples of incarceration following a gang injunction can be seen where a "a
16-year-old youth banned in a gang injunction [in] Oceanside, California, was sentenced to 240 days
in a juvenile detention camp for publicly associating with another defendant." But cf Application of
Gault, 387 U.S. 1,61 (1967) (finding a right to counsel in a civil proceeding where petitioner was
facing six years of confinement in lieu ofa $50-$100 fine).
79
80
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criminal action brought under section 166 of the California Penal Code. 85
The Iraheta court then noted that inherent but not immediate danger of
criminal liability also existed in Lassiter, and yet, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that there was a presumption against counsel. 86 Thus,
in light of the Lassiter court's treatment of future incarceration, the
Iraheta court concluded that the future possibility of criminal action was
not enough to dispel the Lassiter presumption. 87
The additional consideration of family members being enjoined
does not change this analysis. In particular, the fact that family members
are being enjoined from meeting in public does not bring the immediacy
of imprisonment or institutionalization any closer upon a defendant than
it would otherwise. 88 Thus, even considering family interference, there is
probably a presumption against counsel in civil gang injunction cases. 89
B. INTERFERENCE WITH THE FAMILY AND OVERCOMING THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST COUNSEL

After determining that there is a presumption against counsel, the

Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509-11.
1d. at 1511 n.4.
87 "The possibility that [the1defendant [in Salas 1would suffer the loss of his physical liberty,
while a factor, was not a determinative factor." Id. at 1510.
88 There is an argument to be made that one may become a sort of virtual prisoner in public
by enduring the humiliation of not being able to meet his or her family members as they choose. A
broad reading of cases like Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 502 (1977) (finding a
due process violation when the government seeks to interfere with the family through a housing
ordinance) could yield the argument that because a due process violation means there has been a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property a due process violation means that there is a per se
"deprivation of a personal liberty." Although I sympathize with this argument, it is somewhat
attenuated; the legal term "deprivation of personal liberty" is unique and is very rarely used by the
U.S. and California Supreme Courts. Because of this limited use, it is likely that the term has some
special meaning apart (although not discontinuous) from liberty as associated with due process
generally.
89 In the context of the right to counsel in civil cases, it should be noted that it is unclear if
the California Supreme Court has found broader authority under the California Constitution that
does not impose a presumption against counsel. Petition for Review at 9, Iraheta v. Superior Court,
70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999) (No. S078658); People v. lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1507 (1999)
("Petitioners urge this court to disregard the general rule and thus to ignore the second prong of the
Lassiter test"). For example, the California Supreme Court, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Scott v. I/linois, a case that did not find for the appointment of counsel, explained "Scott
is not the law in California." Salas v. Cortez, 24 Ca1.3d 22, 27 n.2 (1979); Petition for Review at 9,
Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999). Also, the later case ofln re Jay R. finds for the right
to counsel in a paternity hearing very similar to the situation in Lassiter where the U.S. Supreme
Court did not find such a right. In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 265 (Ct. App. 1983). Whether or
not the California courts have distinguished their state constitutional due process requirements from
the U.S. Constitution, the nature of the rights involved in civil gang injunctions that interfere with
familial relationships is such that the right to counsel should be required.
85
86
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Iraheta court then held that in order to outweigh the Lassiter
presumption, "petitioners must establish that these civil proceedings may
deprive them of an interest that is as fundamental as a right to physical
liberty or as paramount as the right to the care, custody and management
of one's child.,,90 This is where a civil gang injunction's interference
with the family takes on its significance. If it can be established that
interference with family relationships deprives one of a personal interest
that is as fundamental as the care and custody of one's child, then the
presumption could be overcome. 91
Regarding the first Eldridge factor - the private interests at stake the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process invariably become implicated in the
context of government interference with family relationships.92
Unfortunately, for purposes of measuring the personal liberty at stake,
the lraheta court refused to recognize that any First Amendment rights
were being threatened because of the California Supreme Court's
holding in Acuna. 93 The Acuna court held that if a group targeted by a
civil gang injunction does not exist as an "intimate" or "instrumental"
organization, then First Amendment protections do not apply.94 The
defendant in Acuna did not meet this standard because protection under
"the First Amendment, 'does not extend to joining with others for the
purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights. ",95 Thus under
Acuna a civil gang injunction does not infringe upon any First
Amendment rights. 96
One problem with this approach is that under the Eldridge test, the
private interests at stake are the "potential" injuries a defendant faces. 97

90lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509; see also County of Orange v. Dabs, 29 Cal. App. 4th
999, 1004 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding a right to counsel for defendant "[ e)ven if he cannot be jailed .").
91 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509.
92 "The Supreme Court has found that the Constitution protects the family in general."
Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 1196 (1993);
see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (" ... the Bill of rights is
designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships ... relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional
protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage.").
93 lraheta, Cal. App. 4th at 1511.
94 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1110-12 (1997).
95 1d. at 1112. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).)
96 1d. ("[T)he fact that defendants may 'exercise some discrimination in choosing associates
[by a) selective process of inclusion and exclusion' does not mean that the association or its
activities in Rocksprings is one that commands protection under the First Amendment." (emphasis
added) (quoting N.Y. State Club Assn. v. N.Y. City 487 U.S. I, 13 (1988)).
97 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319,340 (1976).
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While the Acuna court may have ruled that the right to assembly has no
meaning with regard to gang members who gather to deprive "third
parties of their lawful rights," it is possible to imagine situations where
some of the individuals targeted by a civil gang injunction do share a
protected relationship.98 The case of family members being enjoined
from meeting in public presents such a scenario. 99
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[f]amily relationships, by
their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life."loo Because of this special
relationship the Supreme Court has determined that "relationships with
these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element
of personal liberty."lol Thus, because family relationships are properly
defined as "intimate," they are properly entitled to First Amendment
protection of association.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not stopped at the First Amendment
and has gone on to recognize that the Constitution also provides the
family protections from governmental interference under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 For example, in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court found that an ordinance
prohibiting a grandmother and her two grandsons, who were first
cousins, from living together was unconstitutional. 103 Specifically, the
court found that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."lo4 Thus, based upon Moore v. City of East
Cleveland and similar holdings, the Constitution provides general
protection when the government attempts to interfere with the family.lo5
98 Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at1112; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
99Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (\ 999) ("[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment protects against a State's interferences with ... family relationships ... as well as with
an individual's bodily integrity.") (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.
1996).); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20 "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's
interferences with personal decisions relating to ... family relationships.").
100 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
101 Id. at 620.

102 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619-620; Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503, (\ 977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (\974).
103 Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
104 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-640 (\ 974).) The court in Moore also found that the ordinance in question had a "tenuous
relation to [the] alleviation" of the overcrowding at which the ordinance was aimed.
105 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-40; Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
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Therefore, not only is association with the family properly defined
as intimate and protected by the First Amendment,106 but the family also
enjoys additional substantive rights under the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 107 Because the Constitution provides these two
deeply rooted substantive rights to the family,108 consideration of them
should be more important when courts evaluate the private interests at
stake with the Eldridge test. 109 Thus, the procedural protection of courtappointed counsel is necessary to assure that these substantive rights are
appropriately honored. I 10
Moreover, it should also be noted that injunctions, such as those
against Mr. Iraheta and Mr. Buitrago, prove that the possibility of family
members being prohibited from meeting in public as they choose is not
merely an academic exercise. In 1999 Mr. Iraheta was enjoined from
meeting with his twin brother within a specified zone, and in 2007 Mr.
Buitrago faced a suit to prevent him from meeting with his cousin in his
home neighborhood. III
C. F AMIL Y RELATIONSHIPS AS ENTITLED TO CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION

Recognizing that family relationships are entitled to additional
safeguards naturally raises the question: what kinds of relationships are
encompassed by the term "family"? Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has found general rights for the family under the Constitution, it has not
addressed whether such fundamental rights extend to specific family
relationships such as those between siblings or cousins. I 12 However, in
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 632.
106 Roberts, 468 u.s. at 619-20.
107 Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99.
108 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects die sanctity
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition").
109 See lraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (1999).
110 See 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 8 (West 2008). As a general proposition the
rules of civil procedure exist to afford individuals a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
actions. Since "our adversary system presupposes, accurate and just results are most likely to be
obtained through the equal contest of opposed interest" protecting substantive rights with court
appointed counsel will assure that a "just" result is reached. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18,28 (1981).
III Petition for Review, at 14, Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999); Expert
Declaration, at 49, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21,
2007).
112 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187,
1195 (1993). ("Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of siblings'
rights to maintain contact with each other, it has addressed issues relating to the fundamental rights
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Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the Court applied a test to
detennine what constitutes a family relationship.113 In Smith three
factors were considered to determine whether a family relationship
existed: 1) the existence of a biological relationship, 2) the existence of
emotional attachments, and 3) whether the relationship exists apart from
the power of the state. I 14 Thus, whether two siblings or cousins are
"family," and are entitled to generally recognized rights as a family,
seems simple enough under the Smith test. IIS
Siblings and cousins are very often linked both biologically and
emotionally and these links are usually created without the benefit of the
state. When examining relationships where the biological link between
two family members is more attenuated, such as that between cousins, an
examination of the emotional attachments between the family members
can alleviate concerns that the assignment of constitutional protection is
contrived. For instance, in the case of Mr. Buitrago and his cousin, facts
that the two refer to one another as "brother" and that they share the
interrelated nicknames of "Fat Tone" and "Little Tone" demonstrate the
existence of close emotional attachments creating an authentic family
relationship.116 Thus, the detennination of whether siblings or cousins
may properly be considered family as defined by Smith is a factual
question to be detennined on a case-by-case basis. 117
In interpreting these U.S. Supreme Court cases, some lower federal
courts have explicitly granted constitutional protections to relationships
like those shared by siblings. 118 In contrast, at least one lower federal
court has declined to extend such protections. I 19 Much like the lower
of the family. The Supreme Court has found that the Constitution protects the family in general ...
.").
113 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187,
1195 (1993); see Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47
(1977).
114 Smith, 431 U.S. at 843-46 (1977).
115 Barbara Jones Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1187,
1208 (1993).
116 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2, People V. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492, (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
117 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187
(1993).
118 See, e.g., Aristotle P. V. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, lOll (N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the growing body of decisional law articulating the
associational rights of siblings); see also County of Fulton V. Whalen, No. 94-540, 1994 WL
16100063 (U.S. Nov. 23,1994).
119 Russ V. Watts, 414 FJd 783,790 (7th Cir. 2005)(finding that the governmental action was
not purposeful); see also B.H. y. Johnson, 715 F. Supp 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. I111989) (finding that
after children had been legally and legitimately separated there was no due process right to
visitation). These cases can be read as building upon the U.S. Supreme Court's statement that
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federal courts, state courts are split on whether to acknowledge the rights
of siblings. 12o
In California rights between siblings have been established but are
not all-encompassing. 121 Much of the advances of sibling associational
rights have occurred in the context of child custody proceedings where
children face being split Up.122 Under California statutory law, child
custody proceedings are determined in accordance with the "best
interest" of the child. 123 Thus, in such proceedings the associational
rights of the children are considered under a statutory mandate to achieve
this end, and the greater constitutional issues involved are rarely
addressed directly. 124
This reluctance to address the constitutional issues probably stems
from the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate to avoid constitutional issues
and a fear of conflicting constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court
has stated that lower courts should "avoid constitutional issues when
resolution of such issues is not necessary for [the] disposition of a

"[h]istorically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government
officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property" rather than being applied to decisions
denying the associational rights of siblings. Daniels v. WiIliams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (\986). Here,
because civil gang injunctions that affect family relationships are an intentional state action which
interferes with the family, such a predication would be difficult to make. But see Ken R. v. Arthur
Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 1996) (finding no constitutional right for siblings to associate
generally).
120 Compare Lv. G., 497 A.2d 215, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (adult sibling had
right to visit with minor sibling over objections of father and stepmother) with Ken R. v. Arthur Z.,
682 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 1996) (although recognizing the "well established" importance ofa sibling
relationship which creates an interest greater than the average citizenry, finding no constitutional
right).
121 See In re Marriage ofWiIliams, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808, 814 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that
"[c]hildren are not community property to be divided equally for the benefit of their parents .. , [a]t
a minimum, the children have a right to the society and companionship of their siblings."). But see
In re Gerald 1., I Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1187 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that "the juvenile court law
expresses no affirmative duty to keep siblings together.").
122 In re Marriage of Williams, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808,814 (Ct. App. 2001).
123 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3120 (West 2004) ("[T]he husband or wife may bring an action for the
exclusive custody of the children of the marriage. The court may, during the pendency of the action,
or at the final hearing thereof, or afterwards, make such order regarding the support, care, custody,
education, and control of the children of the marriage as may be just and in accordance with the
natural rights of the parents and the best interest of the children.").
124 In re Luke, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1424 (Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to address the idea of
associational rights in a constitutional sense, foreseeing a conflict between parental due process
rights over siblings; "our decision is a narrow one and we express no opinion regarding the relative
importance of sibling relationships and the right to parent."); see also William Wesley Patton, The
Status of Siblings' Rights: A View Into the New Millennium, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 38 (2001)
(concluding in part that "courts have seldom agreed to address the issue [of sibling's associational
rights]"). Contra In re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th 444, 449 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
siblings have a "right to the society and companionship of their siblings.").
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case." 125 Because child custody hearings can be predicated upon the
statutory mandate of the "best interest" of the child, the resolution of
constitutional issues is not necessary for such actions. 126 In contrast,
civil gang injunctions targeting family relationships provide a situation
where constitutional recognition of such issues can no longer be avoided.
There is also some concern that by directly addressing these
constitutional issues and recognizing additional familial rights, such as
that between siblings or cousins, the courts will create a conflict between
these newly recognized rights and the right of a parent to have custody
over their children. 127 The fear is that such a conflict would put the
courts in the awkward position of valuing these competing fundamental
rights between parents, cousins, and siblings. 128 However, such fears are
misplaced because such a conflict of interests can still be resolved under
the "best interest" of the child standard in situations of child custody.129
Moreover, as encouragement that such a constitutional interpretation is
warranted, recent California decisions have indicated that there is a
broader public policy for the state of California to acknowledge the
rights of siblings to associate. l3O Because civil gang injunctions involve
a scenario where there is no controlling statute to protect family
members, broader family rights, such as those between siblings to
associate, should and can now be directly addressed.
The Supreme Court has stated "[o]ur decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 131 In light of such language, the kind of private interests at
stake in gang injunctions, like the ones faced by Mr. Buitrago and Mr.

125 See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642 (1985) ("We avoid constitutional issues when
resolution of such issues is not necessary for disposition of a case.").
126 See In re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th 444, 449-450 (Ct. App. 2004) (overturning
trial court's decision to split up siblings, as it was not in the best interests of the children); see also In
Re Luke, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1420-23 (basing the placement of siblings upon CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 358.1,16002 (West 2003)}.
127 Francis McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status And Meaning of Paternal Rights,
22 GA. L REV. 975, 1006 (l988) ("[W)henever there are conflicts between ... parents and their
children ... framing all of the contending positions in terms of family rights will only confound any
constitutional analysis and serve to negate any claims of rights.").
128 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1187,
1215-20 (1993).
129
Id .
130 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 88 Cal. App.4th 808, 814 (Ct. App. 2001) ("At a
minimum, the children have a right to the society and companionship of their siblings."); see also In
re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 450 ("[I)t is the policy of this state that siblings should
be allowed to grow up together .... ").
131 Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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Iraheta, are significant beyond what was considered in Iraheta. 132 Not
only does the Iraheta court's analysis not address the private interests at
stake in the proper context of a potential deprivation as demanded by
both the Eldridge and Lassiter tests,133 but the court also does not
address the deprivation of familial rights even though it was an issue
before the court. 134 In viewing the family relationship, it is apparent that
this is a deeply rooted and intimate interest that the Constitution protects
from governmental interference. 135 Because family relationships are the
kind of interests that the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed deserving of
protection, the potential interference with family relationships should
overcome the presumption against counsel. 136 Moreover, even if the
threat to this interest is not enough to overcome the presumption against
the right to counsel, it should at least result in a very strong showing
under the private interests prong of the Eldridge test, which, coupled
with a renewed analysis under the other two prongs of the test, should
overcome the presumption against counsel. 137
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST AND THE RISK OF AN ERRONEOUS
DEPRlV ATION IN LIGHT OF FAMIL Y RELATIONSHIPS

The need for the right to counsel is further strengthened with a
reconsideration of the governmental interests and the risks of an
erroneous decision involved in gang injunctions that threaten to interfere
with family relationships. Analysis of the governmental interests

I32 The word "family" appears only once in the opinion, when the court states:
"the
Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's interferences with ... family relationships."
Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (Cl. App. 1999). The words "brother,"
"twin" and "sibling" do not appear anywhere in the opinion.
133 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319,340 (1976).
134 The Iraheta court does say that the "Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's
interferences with ... family relationships." Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509. However, it does not
address whether Mr. Iraheta has such a threatened relationship.
135 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("[T]he institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history."); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997) ("[F]amily relationships. "
involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.").
136 See In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251 (Cl. App. 1983) (finding a right to counsel because
severance of the parent-child relationship amounts to a taking of liberty). Contra Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (finding that "many of the rights and liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected ... ").
137 This comment is not proposing that civil gang injunctions should not be able to target
family members. Family members do commit crimes together. When family members do commit
crimes together and share in a criminal relationship - such as gang membership - that relationship
should be subject to the same constraints as any other criminal relationship.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/2

20

Jones: Counsel in Civil Gang Injunctions

2008]

COUNSEL IN CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS

61

involved reveals that the government has a general interest in refraining
from interference with the family whenever possible. 138 Moreover, even
when such interference with the family is warranted, the government
nevertheless has a very strong interest in assuring that such interference
is not wrongful. 139 Because wrongful interference can best be avoided by
the appointment of counsel, its use is warranted.
Further, analysis of the risk of an erroneous decision as
conceptualized by the Iraheta court will reveal the following: 1) civil
gang injunctions that interfere with family relationships affect the kinds
"private affairs" that warrant a redistribution of resources to appoint
counsel; and 2) the solution the lraheta court envisions to deal with
complex litigation is itself complex, inefficient, and unfair.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that when dealing with matters
of the family, it "must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation.,,14o Thus far, such language has been
viewed in the context of understanding the familial relationship as a
private interest. 141 However, implicit within such language is also the
notion that the government itself must value the familial interest at
stake. 142 That is, because the Constitution provides protections to the
family from government interference,143 and the government is bound by
the Constitution,144 so then must the government have some interest in
refraining from interfering with the family. 145
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has also stated "[o]f

See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
1d.
140 1d. A distinction can be made from this quote, however, as it was concerned with "choices
concerning family living arrangements," not family associational rights.
141 "A host of cases ... have consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.'" /d. (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944».
142 If the court must examine "the importance of the governmental interests advanced" and
determine whether that interest is worth the disruption of the family, some governmental interests
must be less than the importance of the family. Thus, a family free from governmental regulation is a
governmental interest.
143 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984).
144 U.S. Const. art. VI, § I, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.").
145 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
138

139
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course, the family is not beyond regulation.,,146 The Supreme Court has
found, for example, that in "[a]cting to guard the general interest" the
state may interfere with a parent's right to control the actions of their
children in such matters as child labor and school attendance. 147
Similarly, if family members are fellow gang members, then the state
may also have justification for acting in the general interest to stop their
criminal activities, for "[t]o hold that the liberty of... peaceful,
industrious residents. . . must be forfeited to preserve the illusion of
freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a
whole is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the
whole of its sense.,,148
Thus, in situations where a conflict has arisen between the
government's duty to refrain from interference with the family and its
desire to impose a regulation upon the family, the U.S. Supreme Court's
statement that it must "examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation" takes on a new meaning: how to balance
these competing interests?149 In trying to ascertain how to balance these
interests, an increasingly important question for the government is
whether those family members targeted by a civil gang injunction are
actually gang members. If they are, then the hope of bringing order to a
community facing violence and intimidation in its streets by preventing
those family members from meeting together may justify interference
with a family relationship. 150 However, if they are not gang members,
Id .
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding an aunt could not employ her
minor niece to sell magazines despite any religious imperative to do so); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325-326 (1913) (finding that a prohibition of children under 16 years
from employment in hazardous occupations does not amount to a taking of liberty or property
without due process of law); State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901) (finding that prosecution
of a parent for refusal to comply with state statute requiring compulsory education for minor was
proper).
148 People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1125 (1997); State v. Gaynor, 197 A. 360,
361 (1938) (finding that the 1934 "Gangster Act" was a valid use of legislative authority since public
policy demands that organized groups that "wage war" upon society be abolished). Contra Houston
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471-72 (1967) (finding that the First Amendment invalidates a statute
forbidding verbal criticism of officers: "We are ... mindful that the preservation of liberty depends
in part upon the maintenance of social order ... [but] a certain amount of expressive disorder not
only is inevitable in a society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that
freedom would survive.").
149 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
150 West Virginia v. U.S., 479 U.S. 305, 312 (1987) ("[W]hile courts must show 'solicitude
for state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements,' these
interests may be overridden to avoid injury to "clear and substantial interests of the National
Government.") (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966». The term "may" is used
146

147
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then not only is the government working counter to its own interest in
protecting the family, but the government is at the same time wasting
resources in bringing and enforcing a suit that stands no chance to hinder
gang activity.151
"[O]ur adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and just results
are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed
interests.,,152 Indigent defendants who, like Mr. Buitrago, do not have a
GED, stand little chance of successfully defending themselves against
such a suit on their own. 153 Accordingly, a suit for an injunction could
likely succeed in prohibiting family members from associating with one
another whether or not they share a criminal relationship.154 Thus,
because the Constitution makes the family the government's interest, and
the government has an interest in not wasting legal resources against
those who are not gang members, there is a strong governmental interest
that counsel be provided to family members who are threatened by a civil
gang injunction. 155
in this context because it is not conclusive that civil gang injunctions work. See Cheryl L. Maxson
It's Getting Crazy Out There: Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL'y 577, (2005).
151 "What possible interest can the Government have in preventing members ofa family from
dining as they choose? It is simply none of the Government's business." Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635,645 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining that there is no government interest in defining
"household" for purposes of food stamp allotment because of interference with the family). It is
interesting to note, in reference to this quote, that by imposing a civil gang injunction on family
members the state will actually be prohibiting them from dining "as they choose," since enjoined
family members would not be able to dine together in public. See also Stutson v. United States, 516
U.S. 193, 197 (\996) (recognizing that "[j]udicial efficiency ... [is an) important value").
152 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,28 (\981); County of Orange v. Dabs, 29
Cal. App. 4th 999, 1004 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding "appointed counsel is necessary to assure a 'level
playing field.' This is particularly so in the unique situation where the state has elected to represent
one private citizen against another.").
IS3 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251,263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel."); Opposition
to Application for OSC, at 14, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct.
Sept. 5, 2007).
154 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22,31 (\979) ("A judgment rendered in this manner [without
counsel) is not only unfair, it is unreliable.").
155 For a similarly formulated argument th~t views the private interest at stake as being a kind
of governmental interest in order to find a right to counsel, see Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 33. In Salas, the
court noted "the state has no legitimate interest incorrectly ascribing parentage and imposing the
obligations of fatherhood on someone other than the child's actual father." Id. Also, because this
governmental interest is premised upon litigation not reaching the truth of the matter, this
governmental interest is then also dependent upon the risk of an erroneous decision. In
understanding that the risk of an erroneous decision and the personal interests at stake come together
at a nexus, which is the government's interest, only then can one also appreciate the danger in trying
to fully isolate anyone prong of the Eldridge test. Indeed, the Iraheta court in considering the
argument that "the state has no interest in erroneously branding a person as a gang member"
attempts such an isolation of each interest. Specifically, the Iraheta court stated that "[p)etitioners,
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B. THE RISKS OF AN ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION

These concerns surrounding the personal and governmental interests
at stake are increased by the risk of an erroneous decision in a civil gang
injunction case. However, the Iraheta court specifically weighed such a
risk of error and found it to be of minimal weight. 156 The Iraheta court
considered two arguments as to the risk of an erroneous decision: the
imbalance of resources and the complexity of the issues involved. 157 The
court rejected both of these arguments, explaining an imbalance of
resources is simply a "fact of life,,158 and the complexity required to
appoint counsel is the need for experts, a need the court did not find in
Iraheta. 159 However, careful examination of these arguments reveals just
how great the risk of an erroneous decision is. 160
1. The Imbalance of Resources

The Iraheta court initially acknowledged that Mr. Iraheta was
opposed by the "full resources of the state," a phrase taken from Salas v.
Cortez, a case in which the court found a right to appointed counsel in a
civil setting. 161 However, the Iraheta court did not attribute much
strength to this argument and instead relied on the dissent in Salas, which
stated: "It is an undeniable fact of life that in many civil suits the parties
are unequally matched in terms of legal representation .... ,,162 The
Iraheta court then went on to cite a distinction made in Clark v. County

however, confuse Lassiter's second factor (the government's interest) with Lassiter's third factor
(the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions)." Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70
Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1511 (Ct. App. 1999). In attempting to artificially isolate these interests where
they are necessarily intertwined, the Iraheta court failed to analyze their weight properly.
156 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514 ("This is not a complex legal issue.").
157 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1512-14; see also Petition for Review at 18-21, lraheta v.
Superior Court, No. S078658 (Cal. Mar. 31, 1999), 1999 WL 33746242.
158 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513 (quoting Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 37 (1979)
(Richardson, J., dissenting».
159 1d. at 1514.
160 On the other hand, the lraheta court's determination that imbalance of resources is not a
"decisive factor" is an appropriate distinction to make, as the courts "must balance these elements
against one another." See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981). However, this
language seems to echo earlier language in the opinion when the court stated that "[t]he possibility
that [the] defendant [in Salas] would suffer the loss of his physical liberty, while a factor, was not a
determinative factor." Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510. While this is true, the finding of multiple
factors that are "not determinative" seems to indicate that, even without the consideration of family
interests, civil gang injunctions generally have some of the qualities that call for the appointment of
counsel.
161 Salas v Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 30 (1979).
162 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513.
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of Orange: "clearly, imbalance [of resources] cannot be a decisive
factor, as it is the rare case where the state does not have greater
resources than a private party in any sort of litigation.,,163 This line of
argument does not seem to disagree with the proposition that those
targeted by civil gang injunctions are at a distinct disadvantage and that
this may result in an erroneous decision, but rather contends that life is
tough, many litigants are often at a distinct disadvantage, and the court's
job is not to "equalize all such legal conflicts."I64
The Iraheta court went on to say that of all of those who are at a
distinct disadvantage, it is the "private affair" targeted by the government
that deserves the protections of counsel in a civil case, and since civil
gang injunctions operate under a public nuisance claim, the action
concerns the public at large, not private parties. 165 However, if the court
had addressed the issue that Mr. Iraheta was being enjoined from seeing
his twin brother, it would most likely have found such a "private affair"
as being threatened. The Iraheta court itself stated that there is a "private
affair between a mother and the man she named as the father of her
child" and that "the Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's
interferences with ... family relationships ... [as this area] represent[s] a
'realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. ",166
Thus, in raising the issue of family relationships as being threatened by
civil gang injunctions, the Iraheta court's previous statement that the
appointment of counsel is reserved for private affairs supports the
proposition that counsel should in fact have been appointed. 167
2. The Complexity of the Litigation
The Iraheta court's discussion of why civil gang injunctions do not

163 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513; Clark v. County of Orange, 62 Cal. App. 4th 576, 591
(CI. App. 1998).
164 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513.
165
1d.
166 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509 (quoting Armendariz v. Penman (9th Cir. 1996).)
167 What counts as a "private affair," however, could be distinguished under a narrower
reading of County a/Orange v. Dabbs, 29 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1004 (CI. App. 1994) (fmding that the
need for the appointment of counsel "is particularly so in the unique situation where the state has
elected to represent one private citizen against another."). Using this language, one can argue that
there is only interference with a "private affair" when the state is actually acting upon the interest of
a single party, rather than the "entire community," as a nuisance does under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480
(West 2008). If this is the case, then the fact that those targeted by a civil gang injunction are also
family members does not matter, since this would not change that the injunction is being brought on
behalf of the entire community. However, such a reading runs counter to intuition, and even the
lraheta court held that there is a "private affair between a mother and the man she named as the
father of her child." lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513.
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rise to the level of complexity that demands the appointment of counsel
is perhaps the most unsettling part of the opinion. The Iraheta court
dismisses the idea that the issues at stake in a civil gang injunction are as
complex as the issues presented in Salas, a case that included DNA and
blood group testing. 168 The court begins by noticing "[t]he only issue
petitioners have identified that cannot be raised by way of subsequent
collateral attack (if and when petitioners violate the preliminary
injunction) is whether petitioners are gang members.,,169 The Iraheta
court then points out that by using the tool of collateral attack a
defendant has the option of violating the court order, receiving courtappointed counsel in the ensuing criminal case, and then collaterally
attacking all of the issues that were litigated in the civil case with the
court-appointed counsel. 170 Thus, the court concludes that there is no
need to consider court-appointed counsel to deal with the complexity of
the original action because a defendant has a way to get court-appointed
counsel to re-litigate these civil issues. 171
The court's suggestion that a defendant may violate a court order so
that he or she may obtain criminal counsel to re-litigate the civil issues
involved in a gang injunction presents issues of efficiency and fairness.
Issues of efficiency exist because the court is essentially acknowledging
that court-appointed counsel can, and in proper circumstances should,
litigate the issues that arise in civil gang injunction actions. l72 However,
the path the court has laid out for a defendant to obtain appointed counsel

168

Iraheta,70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514.

169

I d. A "collateral attack" is defined as "[aJ n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other

than a direct appeal; esp., an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in
which the ground of the proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is
ineffective ... A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack.-Also termed
indirect attack." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
170 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514.
171 In order to mount a collateral attack upon the injunction, the Iraheta court suggested that a
defendant could rely on CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 533 and 904.1 (West 1999). Iraheta, 70 Cal.
App. 4th at 1514 n.6. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 533 (West 1999) reads as follows: "In any action, the
court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing
that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining
order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted
has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modi fication or dissolution of the
injunction or temporary restraining order." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1999) reads as
follows: "(a) An appeal, other than in a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other
than in a limited civil case, may be taken from any of the following ... (6) From an order granting or
dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction."
172 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514 ("[TJo argue that the risk of an erroneous decision is
more likely due to the complexity of the facts is also misplaced. The only issue petitioners have
identified that cannot be raised by way of subsequent collateral attack (if and when petitioners
violate the preliminary injunction) is whether petitioners are gang members.").
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utilizes many steps that could simply be eliminated. To demand that an
indigent defendant go to a civil trial, represent himself, fail to understand
the complex issues involved in the case, lose, have an injunction leveled
against him, violate the injunction, face prosecution, get appointed
counsel, and then re-litigate these complex issues that the court has
already been over, creates significant costs to the system that could and
should be avoided. 173
The issue of fairness arises when the court demands that a litigant
put himself or herself in the awkward position of facing criminal liability
to effectively challenge a civil suit. If the Iraheta court is going to rely
on such possible crirninalliability for the full and fair adjudication of the
issues, then the court should consider the appointment of counsel as
though it were a criminal case. As a result, the court's earlier statement
that there is no deprivation of personal liberty because the possibility of
incarceration is not "directly and immediately implicated" loses its
validity. 174 Because Iraheta sweeps these issues of complexity to the
side by demanding that litigants use a procedural run-around, the court
fails to properly address the complexity of the issues at stake. 175
IV. CONCLUSION
In reconsidering civil gang injunctions and the appointment of
counsel in the new light of family relationships, analysis of the Lassiter
presumption and the weighing of each Eldridge factor brings forth a call
for counsel. However, in the wake of the Iraheta decision, individuals
like Mr. Buitrago are not ordinarily provided counsel and normally face a

173 See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996) (recognizing that "[j]udicial
efficiency ... [is an) important value"). Moreover, "[t)he process of researching and obtaining gang
injunctions is expensive, incurring between $400,000 and $500,000 in legal costs." Matthew
Werdeger, Enjoining the Constitution, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 442 (1999). Earlier the Iraheta court
stated "the People have a legitimate interest in avoiding the expense of appointed counsel and the
cost of the lengthened proceedings his or her presence may cause," and "the financial ramifications
could well be extraordinary." lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1511-12. By engaging the complex issues
in a civil gang injunction case via this inefficient process of collateral attack, the court has implicitly
relaxed its concern. While the justice system would not be paying for appointed counsel in the first
proceeding, it would nonetheless be paying for the city attorney, judge, and court staff. In addition,
in the second proceeding, the justice system would then have to pay for the city attorney, judge,
court staff and the public defender.
174 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510.
175 The Court's solution to complexity is itself very complex; it "ignores the fact that since
petitioners are not lawyers, they would not even know where to begin to engage in these options.
Moreover, if petitioners violated the injunction, and were then appointed attorneys in the criminal
case, it is unlikely that a successful appeal, modification, or dissolution of the injunction by the
criminal defense lawyers would in any way affect the criminal contempt prosecution." Petition for
Review at 18 n.5, lraheta v. Superior Court, No. S078658, 1999 WL 33746242 (Cal. Mar. 31, 1999).
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difficult situation. Unable to afford an attorney, they would have to hope
for pro bono representation or face the dangerous task of selfrepresentation. 176 If Mr. Buitrago did represent himself, it is doubtful
that he, a man who is in the process of trying to get his GED, would be
able to mount a reasonable - let alone formidable - defense against the
application for injunction. 177 Perhaps certain facts would come to light,
for instance, that his alleged gang related moniker, "Tone," is a family
nickname given to him by his uncle when he was four l78 and that he and
his cousin are respectively referred to as "Fat Tone" and "Little Tone.,,179
It may also come to light that Mr. Buitrago has no criminal record. 18o On
the other hand, more complex legal arguments pointing to the balance of
the harm imposed by the injunction, or the possibility that any of the
provisions of the injunction are void for vagueness, would most likely be
out of reach for Mr. Buitrago. In the absence of all of these defensive
arguments, a civil gang injunction might easily be imposed on a nongang member. 181
However, because Mr. Buitrago lives in San Francisco, he found
himself with a bit of luck. The charter of the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office includes a mandate to protect not only those who are
facing prosecution, but also those facing a "danger of criminal

176 19A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 109 (2001): "The following is a suggested admonition
to a defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation: I. Self-representation
is almost always unwise and the defendant may conduct a defense to his or her own detriment; 2.
Defendant will ... get no help from the judge; 3. The prosecution will be represented by experienced
professional counsel who will have the advantage of skill, training, education, experience and
ability; and 4. Defendant will have no special library privileges, will receive no extra time for
preparation and will have no staff of investigators at his or her beck and call."
177 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel."). Also in
cases where counsel is provided, it has been noted that "[a]lthough a defendant need not himself
have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation .... " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (finding that although a state
may not force an attorney upon a criminal defendant, it is almost always a good idea not to represent
oneself); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 14, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
178 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
179 Mr. Buitrago is to this day still "very heavy"; he is 5' II" tall and weighs 320 pounds.
Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492, (San
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
180 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007).
181 In re Jay R .• 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel.").
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prosecution.,,182 Violation of the civil gang injunction subjects the
individual to criminal prosecution and punishment of imprisonment for
up to six months in county jail.I83 Accordingly, the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office may, and did, intervene on Mr. Buitrago's behalf. 184
In fact, it is likely due to the intervention of the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office that a San Francisco judge ruled on October 12,2007,
that there was not "clear and convincing evidence" that Antonio Buitrago
is an active gang member, and thus he is not subject to the effects of this
particular civil gang injunction. 185
So, Mr. Buitrago is in luck; he may still see his cousin in public. In
California, however, being lucky is the exception rather than the rule; in
other counties in California, the Public Defender's Office does not have
such a broad mandate and cannot intervene. 186 Without such a broad
mandate those who face the loss of a familial relationship and are unable
to hire counsel face a bleak situation. 187 They face lawsuits that seek to
stop criminal actions but afford none of the protections of criminal
law. 188 They face actions that threaten to interfere with important,

182 San Francisco Charter § 6.104 ("The Public Defender shall, upon the request of an accused
who is financially unable to employ counsel, or upon order of the Court, defend or give counselor
advice to any person charged with the commission of a crime or in danger of criminal prosecution.").
183 CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (2008); Opposition to Application for OSC, at I, People v.
Norteno, No. cac 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). Because imprisonment is
brought within the realm of the possible, Mr. Buitrago is "in danger" of criminal liability and the San
Francisco Public Defender may intervene.
184 Opposition to Application for OSC, People v. Norteno, No. cac 07-464492 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007).
185 Demian Bulwa, Judge Gives Norteiios Strict Restrictions at http://www.sfgate.comlcgibiniarticle.cgi?-f=/c/a/2007/10/16/BANNSQ9SI.DTL (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) (SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 2007). It should be pointed out, as noted by San Francisco City Attorney
Dennis Herrera, that "[t]he court didn't say (Buitrago) wasn't a gang member, but that there wasn't
clear and convincing evidence that he was." [d.
186 For example, Los Angeles Charter article VI, section 23, allows only for appointment
when one is charged or has a reasonable appeal to make from a conviction. The section reads:
"Upon request by the defendant or upon order of the court, the Public Defender shall defend, without
expense to them, all persons who are not financially able to employ counsel and who are charged, in
the Super. Ct., with the commission of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense. He
shall also, upon request, give counsel and advice to such person in and about any charge against
them upon which he is conducting the defense, and he shall prosecute all appeals to a higher court or
courts, of any person who has been convicted upon any such charge, where, in his opinion, such
appeal will, or might reasonably be expected to, result in a reversal or modification of the judgment
of conviction."
187 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 31 (1979) ("A judgment rendered in this manner [without
counsel] is not only unfair, it is unreliable.").
188 For the standards used in a civil gang injunction, see People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App.
4th. 1236, (Ct. App. 2001) (finding there is no right to a jury trial in a civil gang injunction action,
and the standard of clear and convincing evidence is used in the determination of such actions); see
also People v. Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514-1515 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to
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legitimate, and established constitutional rights to associate with their
families as they choose.1 89 This dangerous combination warrants the
appointment of counsel to ensure due process under the Constitution.
ALEXANDER JONEl

counsel in a civil gang injunction action). In contrast, for the standards used in criminal cases, see
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [to a
trial] by an impartial jury."); Clark v. Ariz., 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) ("[A] defendant is innocent
unless and until the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense
charged."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (finding a right to counsel in criminal
actions).
189 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) .
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